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Participation in a Small Archipelago: the Shetland negotiations 
James Mitchell 
 
Before the oil 
Shetland lies 700 miles north of London, 300 miles north of Edinburgh and is 200 miles from 
Bergen. The islands are about 100 miles long and 35 miles across at the widest point. Their 
history has been “interpreted as a succession of peoples who came by sea, who settled and 
built up a way of life only to have it replaced by the culture of new arrivals.”1 While other 
communities had similar experiences, Shetland’s unique experience relates to its geography 
lying at the crossroads between Scandinavia and the British isles. This history and its 
remoteness give rise to its cultural, economic and political distinctiveness. As a report 
commissioned by Shetland Islands Council noted in 1978, “Shetland is different… It should 
be said that this difference is first one of perception. Shetlanders see themselves as 
different, as a unique contained historic community. This perception is supported by 
geography and history. Shetland is remote.”2 This difference has also been evident in its 
politics. Orkney and Shetland returned Jo Grimond one of only 12 Liberal MPs across the UK 
in 1950. In the 1975 referendum on European Economic Community membership, Shetland 
and the Western Isles were the only two local authorities in the UK to vote against 
membership. 
Shetland’s population had been in long-term decline before oil was discovered and stood at 
17,567 at the 1971 census compared with over 30,000 a century before. In 1971, Shetland 
consisted of around 25 inhabited islands ranging from the Shetland mainland with just 
under 6,000 people to Trondra with twenty people. Each community was different and 
providing public services, including transport, was challenging. By the late 1960s, its 
economy was heavily dependent on external support from UK central government. Fishing 
and fish processing provided about thirty percent of employment and twenty percent of 
Shetland’s income and about ninety-five percent of the land was suitable for rough grazing 
for sheep farming. These industries along with knitwear were the staples of islands’ 
economy.3 
As far back as 1953, an academic study had concluded that the islands were “balancing on 
the knife-edge between solvency and insolvency.”4 One author noted a “symptom of 
Shetland’s decline was the stress placed on education; for education was not designed to 
equip school-leavers to live and work successfully within the islands: it was regarded as a 
passport to a good job the British mainland. The lack of opportunity at home was reflected 
in the scores of young people who lined the rails of the passenger vessel St Clair on her 
twice weekly trip to Aberdeen.”5 However there was a view that by the early 1970s Shetland 
                                                 
1 James Nicolson, Shetland and Oil (London, William Luscombe, 1975) 28. 
2 Baron Kilbrandon and the Nevis Institute, The Shetland Report, a Constitutional Study Prepared for the 
Shetland Islands Council by The Nevis Institute under the Chairmanship of Lord Kilbrandon (Edinburgh, Nevis 
Institute, 1978), 19. 
3 I. H. McNicoll and G. Walker, The Shetland Economy 1976/77: Structure and Performance, Unpublished 
Report (Edinburgh: Department of Business Studies, Edinburgh University, 1978) quoted in Kilbrandon, The 
Shetland Report, 22. 
4 Thelma Blance, “The Economy of Shetland, 1930-52” (MA diss., Aberdeen University, 1953).  
5 James Nicolson, Shetland and Oil, 39. 
  
had turned a corner. With the support of the Highlands and Islands Development Board, as 
a government regeneration agency established in 1965, the Islands had seen its population 
stabilize and new fish processing and knitwear factories has been set up. 
 
A major overhaul of the system of local government was initiated in the 1960s. A Royal 
Commission (Wheatley) recommended that Shetland should be incorporated into Highland 
Region, a huge area with Inverness as the administrative centre lying almost 300 miles away 
across the North Sea and much of the Highlands. Shetlanders opposed the move seeing it as 
leaving the islands on the remote periphery of what they perceived would be a massive 
proposed new entity – 275 miles across sea and land separated Lerwick from Inverness, the 
proposed seat of Highland Council - and campaigned against inclusion. There were salutary 
lessons that would be useful in later campaigns. As one of the key local figures later 
explained, “For reasons of the Wheatley exercise, and others… we began in Shetland to 
understand the power of the media – press, radio and TV – and to develop some ability at 
least in this form of communication.”6 This was the era when small units of government 
were deemed unviable but the campaign by Shetlanders paid off. A new two tier system of 
local government across Scotland was created with smaller District Councils and larger 
Regional Councils but a degree of continuity occurred when Westminster bowed to pressure 
to allow Shetland, along with two other island archipelagoes, to be retained as an island 
authority with a largely undisturbed range of responsibilities. Lerwick Town Council was 
merged into Shetland County Council to form Shetland Islands Council in 1975.  
 
Opportunities, threats and choices 
In 1967, oil and gas were discovered in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea. This raised 
the possibility of similar finds in the UK sector. Shetland would be the nearest landfall for a 
large part of potential oil development. In 1971, Shell/Esso made a major oil discovery in the 
East Shetland basin – the Brent field – but only disclosed this in August 1972. Business 
confidentiality and the desire to have time to make preparations were likely explanations 
for withholding this discovery. Subsequent discoveries meant that Shetland would indeed 
become crucial to oil development and the islands’ economy and society would be 
transformed. 
Oil companies and the UK Government saw the North Sea as offering great opportunities. 
North Sea oil wealth was impossible to calculate precisely, not least as new fields kept being 
discovered, fluctuating oil prices and the engineering challenges made costs of and profits 
from extraction uncertain. Geopolitical developments resulted in oil prices quadrupling over 
the winter of 1973/74. The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) had gone on strike in 
1972 and 1974 adding to the UK Government’s energy crisis. The UK had serious balance of 
payments problems made worse by the need to import of oil. In April 1974, the Scottish 
Secretary wrote to Prime Minister Harold Wilson, who had been returned as Prime Minister 
in February to head a Labour Government, and noted that the Shetland developments were 
“extremely important for our oil supplies” with forecasts suggesting that the equivalent of 
                                                 
6 Edward Thomason, “Shetland in the Seventies: A Shetlander’s View of Oil,” in Scandinavian Shetland: An 
Ongoing Tradition? ed. John R Baldwin (Edinburgh, Scottish Society of Northern Studies, 1978), 44. 
  
the UK’s total consumption of oil would be coming ashore in Shetland by 1982.7 Adding to 
the pressure, the Scottish National Party (SNP) won seven seats in the February 1974 
election and went on to win a further four in October’s election. Lying in second place 
across much of the rest of Scotland, the SNP posed a major electoral threat with possibility 
of Scotland breaking away as an independent state controlling oil in the North Sea. 
 
The need for oil was not just related to the UK’s energy needs. There were serious structural 
problems in the economy that were becoming increasingly obvious around this time 
culminating in a major crisis in the mid-1970s. In 1976, Prime Minister Jim Callaghan had to 
go cap in hand to the International Monetary Fund to borrow $3.9b ($17.3b in 2018 prices). 
As Callaghan said the following year, “God has given Britain her best opportunity for one 
hundred years in the shape of North Sea oil.”8 Getting oil out of the North Sea as quickly as 
possible would be a priority for the UK Government. Oil companies shared this objective but 
this would present technological and engineering challenges. It would not be in the interests 
of the oil companies to reveal details of risk assessments but they were keen to emphasise 
the dangers, difficulties and costs. The extent of the North Sea bonanza for the oil 
companies would only become clear in time. But in the early 1970s, the activity of oil 
companies was evidence that these companies saw the risk as worthwhile. Any knowledge 
that the oil companies possessed was not likely to be shared with the UK Government or 
local communities. Given the geopolitical implications of oil with massive multinational 
companies involved and energy becoming a key issue in global politics, the North Sea was 
also attracting the interest of the Federal Government in the United States. This was the 
context in which a small island authority with its various communities would have to 
contend. 
For Shetlanders, however, other considerations were paramount. Oil development would 
involve massive disruption, challenge traditional ways of life, and potentially damage 
Shetland’s existing fragile economy. In October 1972, the local paper complained, “It is 
almost pathetic that the Government, pinning its hopes on oil for the economic salvation of 
Scotland, seems to have left it to a relatively impoverished local authority to wrestle with 
the enormous infrastructural problems of the oil boom.”9 There were inevitably different 
views in the islands covering the “whole spectrum from excitement to anxiety, while for 
those who did not wish to see Shetland changed in any way by the oil industry, there was 
still the comforting thought that so far no oil had been discovered off Shetland, or at least 
no finds had been announced. It was still possible to dream that the oil men would drill only 
dry wells.”10 But others saw an opportunity to secure the islands future. Others still saw the 
opportunities in more individualistic terms. Shetland had hardly featured in Whitehall 
thinking prior to oil. Many years later, a senior Scottish Office civil servant recalled a 
meeting when a ‘very senior official’ at the Treasury opened discussion by asking where 
Shetland was and whether it consisted of one or two islands.11 The archipelago’s far 
                                                 
7 William Ross, “Landing of Offshore Oil Shetland,” Note to Prime Minister from William Ross, Secretary of 
State for Scotland, April 11, 1974, National Archives, PREM 16/614,. 
8 Christopher Harvie, Fool’s Gold (London Hamish Hamilton 1994), 2. 
9 Shetland Times, October 11, 1972. 
10 Nicolson, Shetland and Oil, 69. 
11 Gavin McCrone, “The Development of North Sea Oil and Gas,” held 11 December 1999, Institute of 
Contemporary British History, 2002, p.84. 
  
northerly position meant that it appeared on maps of the UK in a box off the east coast of 
Scotland.12  
On Christmas day 1971, Shetlanders watched the Ocean Traveller drilling rig anchoring 
outside Lerwick harbour, a visual symbol of impending change. The number of oil service 
vessel visits to Shetland soared from 79 in 1971 to 1809 by 1976. Sumburgh airport, in the 
South of Shetland, was witnessing more activity and there was the beginning of land 
speculation in the early 1970s.13 Oil’s impact was also evident in the increased number of 
telephone connections and numbers of television licences acquired as well as house 
building: 106 new houses were completed in 1974, rising to 296 the following year and 471 
in 1976. As Jonathan Wills, a Labour activist who would later become editor of the local 
newspaper, later remarked, the largest contracts that the Council had dealt with had been 
“valued in tens of thousands of pounds” and by the mid-1970s they were dealing with 
“hundreds of millions.”14 The local council faced a number of challenges: 
 aggregating and articulating divergent views in Shetland’s communities; 
 gaining formal legal powers to manage oil development; 
 negotiating with UK Govt and oil companies, requiring expertise in highly technical 
complex engineering, economic and legal matters 
 addressing the rapid economic and social changes that were occurring due to oil 
after 1971. 
While oil developments would have an impact throughout the archipelago, some places 
would be more affected than others. Opportunities and threats existed unevenly and would 
require careful and sensitive responses.  
The early 1970s saw intense debate in the islands. Each of its many communities considered 
the prospects and most were divided. Scalloway, base to the ‘Shetland bus’ Norwegian 
special operations during the second world war, was one example. It had the potential to 
become a major service base for oil rigs and Council officials addressed local meetings and a 
Scalloway Development Trust was set up with all shades of opinion represented. Efforts 
were made to offer information in various forms to the local community before a 
referendum was held which resulted in a narrow victory supporting development. However, 
it was decided to accommodate the views of opponents and the proposed development 
scheme was altered. This process of deliberation was also evident in other local 
communities. A local referendum was also held on Unst, part of which was represented by 
the Council Convener and where the community was divided. The local community of about 
1,100 people, opposed compulsory land purchase but favoured development and accepted 
that it could incorporate between 250 and 500 people over a number of years. 15 A petition 
signed by 95 of 96 households in Unst was sent to the UK Government setting out the view 
that the oil companies could use the piers but should install massive tanks on hills away 
                                                 
12 Gavin McCrone quoted in Gillian Staerk, ed., The Development of North Sea Oil and Gas (London, Institute of 
Contemporary British History, 2002), 84. 
13 J.M. Fenwick, “The Shetland Experience: a Local Authority Arms Itself for the Oil Invasion,” Scottish 
Government Yearbook 1978, 33-50, 34. 
14 Jonathan Wills, A Place in the Sun: Shetland and Oil – Myths and Realities (St Johns, Newfoundland: Institute 
of Economic and Social Research, 1991), 14. 
15 Nicolson, Shetland and Oil, 82-84. 
  
from the villages. They also wanted assurances that any land bought by compulsory order 
that proved unnecessary should be offered for sale back to the previous owner. There was 
also a desire to have a lengthier period for consultation.16  
In September 1973, the Council agreed a policy:  
This County Council, recognising that it may be in the national interest that Shetland 
be used for oil installations, and having sought to devise policies and to provide 
machinery which recognise the national interest while protecting those of the 
Shetland Community, will continue to have regard for the national interest but will 
give no encouragement to developments and will oppose proposals where these 
developments or proposals put Shetland at unnecessary risk or fail to provide 
available safeguards and will at no time put commercial or industrial interests before 
those of the Shetland Community.17 
 
In October 1973, public meetings were held in the villages nearest Sullom Voe, which was 
increasingly seen as the most likely sight of a major oil development. Almost half the 
villagers turned out. Comments were invited and received amounting to many pages of 
about an inch in thickness. Much of the discussion focused on whether a new town should 
be created or whether an existing village should be extended. An iterative process 
developed of consultation, deliberation and revised plans eventually leading to the Sullom 
Voe District Plan in June 1974 which was approved by the Council in September. It 
envisaged the biggest oil port in Europe housing up to 1000 incoming families. The Council 
took pride in the process regarding it as an example of successful public engagement.18 
Brae, for example, grew substantially as the terminal developed but the local community 
was largely united and a community association was formed to negotiate with the Council 
and developers. A local referendum resulted in near unanimity in favour of development.19 
Oil had stimulated community activity and forged new associations. 
There was considerable potential for divide-and-rule in the community by oil companies and 
there were individuals and communities tempted by lucrative side deals. There were also 
legitimate concerns. Fishing interests were concerned that oil developments would 
undermine the local fishing industry. Oil spillage, drilling and fleets of oil vessels were feared 
as likely to damage the industry. There was a sharp fall in fish prices in 1973/74 adding to 
the industry’s precariousness. Unemployment levels were relatively low (2.2% in 1974) but 
so too were incomes adding to concerns that traditional industries would struggle to 
compete with the lure of work in ‘black gold’. The limited pool of local labour meant that 
existing industries would be drained of labour and there would be an influx of large 
numbers of workers to service the oil industry. By the end of 1972 when five oil fields had 
been discovered, it was estimated that there would need to be about 1,000 extra people 
brought to Shetland.20 A paper prepared for the council in 1973 warned that when oil 
developments waned the “isolation of Shetland will make it difficult to find alternative 
employment for the redundant workers and the resulting depopulation will have serious 
                                                 
16 Ibid, 90. 
17 Quoted in Staerk, The Development of North Sea Oil and Gas, 95. 
18 Fenwick, “The Shetland Experience,” 43. 
19 Nicolson, Shetland and Oil, 82-84. 
20 Nicolson, Shetland and Oil, 79. 
  
psychological as well as more direct economic repercussions.” It identified related 
challenges:  
[A]ll of the labour must be imported to the Islands and that in a short time creates 
further problems which will demand immediate solution. Schools, hospitals, social 
services, shopping facilities will be required with the earliest influx of population. 
The incoming workers will have pastimes which are dissimilar to the traditional 
Shetland pastimes. It is likely that their demands will be more sophisticated and will 
require capital expenditure of some magnitude. These facilities will take time to 
provide and their construction will be made the more difficult by the other demands 
on building labour.21  
 
There were also concerns that oil workers would bring trouble – drugs, vandalism, theft, and 
prostitution.22 
A Council meeting in December 1973 approved a ten point plan aimed at responding to 
local concerns about compulsory purchase. This included a commitment to consult fully 
before any action was taken by the Council; that good agricultural land would be conserved 
wherever possible; and that accommodation would be provided in areas of choice where 
tenants had to be rehoused. 
 
Capacity building 
Shetland’s southerly archipelago neighbour Orkney had been engaged in similar 
endeavours. Information gathered by Orkney Council was shared with Jo Grimond MP. In 
September 1973, senior Orkney officials visited Pembrokeshire County Council and the 
Amoco Tanker Terminal and Refinery at Milford Haven. The report back to the Council 
identified key lessons: 
1. Harbour powers are essential to exercise strict control over present and future 
developments to ensure that these are in line with the council’s policy. 
2. While some oil companies are better than others there are no “good” oil 
companies and verbal assurances should not be given too much credence. This also 
includes expert advice submitted by oil companies to persuade a Planning Authority 
that their proposals with regard to any particular development are the only practical 
proposals. In this respect an Authority should –  
(a) insist that any undertakings given by oil companies are reduced to 
formal writing, and 
(b) seek their own expert advice 
3. In the initial stages of negotiations a Local Authority should extract from any oil 
company the maximum benefit possible. 
                                                 
21 Zetland County Council Bill – Peculiarities of Shetland, Lerwick, May 28, 1973, Grimond papers, National 
Library of Scotland, Dep.363, Box 16(2). 
22 Nicolson, Shetland and Oil, 79. 
  
4. A Local Authority should ensure that ant pollution measures remain the 
responsibility of individual oil companies and obtain written agreement on this 
matter. 
5. A Local Authority should ensure that at the end of development there should be 
reinstatement of the land involved with the exception of those buildings and 
installations which will be of permanent use to the Authority. 
6. Properly controlled oil related development is beneficial to a community but such 
development creates a chain reaction and steps must be taken to ensure that such a 
reaction does not adversely affect the local economy…23 
This advice would be key to how Orkney and Shetland engaged with the oil industry. A 
related lesson was to ensure that only one terminal, determined by the council, would be 
developed and not a series of smaller terminals for each oil company. There was no desire 
to see what one MP would refer to as the “proliferation of harbour facilities” as at Milford 
Haven in Wales.24 
Shetland had been one of the few local authorities in the UK without a development plan 
before oil was discovered. The Council needed planners as well as other relevant staff. Ian 
Clark was the Shetland Council’s Treasurer and later chief executive and played a key 
leadership role identifying oil’s potential benefits for the islands.25 In 1975, US Consul in 
Edinburgh Richard Funkhouser described Clark as a ‘tyrant’ in a telegram to the US State 
Department. Funkhouser referred to Clark having “hornswaggled some of the biggest 
multinationals and most sophisticated leaders in Britain out of terms for the development of 
Sullom Voe which would make Scottish nationalists pale with envy.” The Council, the US 
diplomat maintained in this private message released under Freedom of Information, “had 
forced the majors into giving them a highly profitable partnership for which they had put up 
no funds and over which they won significant control, 'the bigger they are, etc.”26 
A key appointment was that of John Manson, a Shetlander who had worked in the oil 
industry as a consultant early in 1972.27 At different stages, various bodies were consulted 
including Parliamentary Agents required for private bill legislation to give the Council the 
powers it needed, merchant bankers as well as engineers and oil industry specialists who 
could advise on what was involved in surveying deepwater anchorages, others who 
specialised in underground storage of oil and gas. It recognised that the highly specialist 
technical knowledge was required though not necessarily because it would be directly 
engaged in this activity but to understand oil, gas and related industries. 
The various interests in oil and gas exploration possessed vastly different levels of 
experience, information and expertise. The lack of a level playing field in negotiations placed 
the local communities and the Council at a significant disadvantage. Councillors and council 
                                                 
23 Report by County Clerk and General Manager on visit to Pembrokeshire, September 17-18, 1973, Grimond 
Papers, National Library of Scotland, Dep363 Box 16. 
24 Norman Lamont, Hansard, House of Commons, April 30, 1973, vol.855, col.883. 
25 Iain Noble, “The Development of North Sea Oil and Gas,” held 11 December 1999, Institute of Contemporary 
British History, 2002, p.79. 
26 “Oil Notes from All Over,” June 30, 1975, Edinburgh to London, Document Number: 1975 EDINBU00150, 
Department of State Telegrams, The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Access to Archival 
Databases (AAD), Electronic Telegrams, 1975, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1979. 
27 Edward Thomason, Island Challenge (Lerwick, Shetland: The Shetland Times Ltd, 1997) 53-54. 
  
officials attended many conferences and seminars as well as visits to comparable 
developments. Consultants were employed and information gathered in an effort to 
rebalance this asymmetry. In late 1971, Lerwick Town Council, representing a population of 
about 6,000 people, sent a delegation to learn from the local community’s experience in 
Bantry Bay Gulf Oil complex in County Cork, Ireland. In late 1972, at its annual general 
meeting the Shetland Civic Society proposed a conference on oil and urged the UK 
Government to restrict oil developments until a full investigation had been conducted. It 
was subsequently suggested that the County Council used the two years from the middle of 
1972 to “buy its ticket to the dance” by preparing to ensure the islands did not lose out.28 
The community would require new expertise and shrewd leadership. It could not rely on the 
wholehearted support of the UK Government given divergent interests on the speed of oil 
extraction.  
However, even with new staff, the Council simply was not legally empowered to negotiate 
with oil companies on many aspects of development to negotiate with the multinational 
extraction industry. It required new powers and increased capacity which it pursued 
through special Parliamentary procedures at Westminster. An early effort was made to 
identify new powers that would be required to ensure developments were planned to 
Shetland’s advantage by the Council. 
 
Sullom Voe and the Zetland County Council Act 
The Council started to prepare to take advantage of new powers it hoped to gain from 
central government before they were granted. It took advice from the National Ports 
Council on how it might operate as a harbour authority and appointed a Ports and Harbour 
Committee. It sought advice from the Department of Trade and Industry on powers 
governing control of piloting and engaged with firms that would be required for towing 
purposes. It also contacted Shell to identify the oil companies needs in the event that the 
legislation was passed. Consultants advised on planning and development. The Council took 
the view that these preparations could not await passage of legislation permitted to act. 
Much of this was done in a short period of time and much was done with less consultation 
than would be expected a generation later. Much of the information gathered was sensitive 
though doubtless much was treated as confidential which might have been made public. 
This contributed to concerns that the Council was being secretive. 
It was soon clear that an oil and gas terminal would be required on Shetland. The Council 
opposed each of the oil companies having its own terminal, having learned this from 
experience elsewhere, and proposed instead a single terminal where oil and gas would be 
piped ashore then transported by tanker to be refined. One oil company, Total Oil Marine 
Ltd had already bought up land and was particularly unhappy with this decision. A 
confidential report to the Council by the County Development Manager identified Sullom 
Voe, an inlet in the north of Shetland’s mainland, as the best site. The report noted which 
land would have to be acquired.29 This focus on Sullom Voe was confirmed in July 1972 by a 
consultancy which found it to be the best natural harbour in the islands for an oil terminal. 
The consultancy referred to the area as ‘Nordport’, an invented Shetland-sounding name. In 
                                                 
28 Fenwick, “The Shetland Experience,” 35. 
29 Michael Stansbury, “Confidential Report on Land for Major Oil Development,” County Development Officer, 
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August, the Council’s Development Office produced the first Shetland Interim Plan which 
sought to ensure that developments would occur in an orderly manner and avoid a free-for-
all. 
In November 1972, the County Council agreed by 23 votes to 5 with 2 abstentions to 
promote a Provisional Order in Parliament to give it the necessary powers to implement its 
emerging plans to acquire land for development; exercise harbour jurisdiction and powers 
in areas likely to be developed; licence construction works in these areas. There were two 
different means by which this might be achieved – a Provisional Order or a Private Bill. In 
March 1973, Parliamentary authorities ruled that the proposals would require the County 
Council to promote a Private Bill, a more complex, costly and time-consuming process than 
a Provisional Order. This process required the services of specialist Parliamentary agents. 
Private Bill procedure allows for legislation that applies to either individuals, groups, 
communities or corporate entities but would not be generally applicable.30 So long as no 
Member of Parliament objected, the procedure could avoid normal Parliamentary 
procedure but Tam Dalyell, MP for West Lothian in central Scotland, objected in order to 
force a debate in Parliament even though he was not opposed to the Bill. It was still subject 
to a public enquiry by an extra-parliamentary panel meeting in Scotland. 
Some businessmen set up a private company, adopting the very name that the consultants 
had proposed for the Sullom Voe area identified for oil development. Nordport Ltd, 
adopting the name invented by the consultants to the Council, already had options for 
40,000 acres of land for oil development and had some support amongst councillors and in 
some communities. Chris Baur, a financial journalist on the Scotsman, the Edinburgh based 
newspaper, researched the company and discovered that behind the local front of Shetland 
businessmen was a complex web of companies leading to Edinburgh merchant bankers.31 
This further convinced the Council that it needed to prevent unplanned development. In 
February 1973, the Council rejected an application from Nordport Ltd for planning 
permission to develop Sullom Voe as an oil terminal. The Council maintained that Nordport 
Ltd’s proposals contravened its planning policy, the application was premature as the 
Council was still studying different places for oil development and that there was 
insufficient detail in what had been submitted. But this was not the final battle with 
Nordport Ltd. 
The Council had a tradition of non-party politics but these developments provoked the 
establishment of a pro-Nordport Ltd grouping on the Council calling itself the Shetland 
Democratic Group with seven councillors. These councillors were led by a local Church of 
Scotland Minister with links to the Conservative Party. It criticised the Council for its secrecy 
and argued that all major decisions should be made by the full council rather than in 
committee but this was defeated by 14 votes to 8. The Council’s Convener (the Scottish 
term for chairperson) at the time took much of the flak and would go down to defeat at the 
local elections in 1973. The intense nature of debate was evident in the turnout in the local 
                                                 
30 The UK Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1936 allows for petitions for private legislation to be 
considered so long as there is no opposition in Parliament. This resulted in an inquiry held in Scotland which 
made a recommendation to the UK Government. The Government then decided on whether to support an 
Order in Parliament. With Parliamentary support, this leads to the passage of private legislation without the 
same Parliamentary stages that would be involved in public legislation. 
31 Wills, A Place in the Sun, 19. 
  
elections: 82% of electors voted in the Council Convener’s ward,32 much higher than 
occurred in a Westminster general election not to mention what normally occurred in a 
local election. The 1973 local elections saw the election of ten Shetland Democratic Group 
members on a Council of 30. The local managing director of Northport Ltd was elected to 
the Council but within a year he stood down from Northport Ltd. The Council elected a new 
Convener and Vice Convener who carried on the policy of their predecessors. The Shetland 
Democratic Group accepted the result and after some concessions progress was made 
without as much acrimony as previously. 
Jo Grimond, local MP, assisted in the process of empowering the council though even he, 
with over twenty years Parliament experience, had to be guided through the intricacies of 
the Private Bill procedure. In introducing the legislation in the Commons, Grimond outlined 
the impact on the local communities and summed up the legislation’s purpose as seeking to 
“achieve orderly planning.”33 Grimond, local councillors and council officials had consulted 
widely across Shetland and the local newspaper had played an important role in giving 
coverage to the various views expressed at meetings. But opposition and the sense that the 
local communities most affected were not sufficiently consulted was not allayed. Grimond 
acknowledged that the Bill “aroused understandable anxiety” in Shetland.34 Some 
councillors took the view that Shetland should oppose oil development though the general 
view was that this could not be avoided as the UK Government desperately needed the oil. 
Those individuals and communities most likely to be affected were in places where the 
Council sought powers to buy land by compulsory order. The local Conservative candidate 
for the general election warned that if there was no right of appeal against compulsory 
purchase then individual Shetlanders would be left ‘defenceless’. 
While debate had raged in Shetland, the Government decided to back at least some of the 
proposals in the Private Bill. It supported the Council becoming the planning and harbour 
authority but had reservations about the Council having a share in the profits of oil 
developers. In late March 1973, the Council estimated that it would cost £3.5m to buy the 
land needed for development and argued that this needed to come from a share in oil 
developments. There was also a view in Government that Ministers ought to have a 
supervisory role and not allow the Council complete autonomy in its proposed new powers. 
This view was shared across the two main parties – Conservative and Labour – at 
Westminster.35 Landowners likely to be affected were informed that there was a prospect of 
their land being compulsorily purchased creating opposition and tensions in the 
communities affected. Some of the local councillors preferred a more open market 
approach or ‘free for all’ as supporters of Council intervention expressed it. Edward 
Thomason, then Council Convener (leader), later conceded that “public relations could have 
been better handled.”36 
The local Labour Party had its concerns, as described by Jonathan Wills, Labour’s candidate 
in both 1974 general elections. The party locally wanted to restrict the development of oil. 
Wills recounted a visit from a group of Labour MPs including Dickson Mabon who would 
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become Minister of State for Energy in 1976. Wills had taken the group to Sullom Voe, while 
it was still a “calm backwater, beautiful to me and others for its birds and scenery” only to 
hear Mabon refer to the place as a “splendid site for a major petro-chemical complex.”37 
The prospect of a petro-chemical complex in Shetland was anathema to most Shetlanders 
and the prospect of this was bound to provoke opposition. Wills himself was one of the 
islanders whose concerns focused on the potential environmental damage and found 
himself in disagreement with colleagues and friends which he explained was partly 
generational. Some older Shetlanders who had experienced harsh economic times viewed 
concern for the environment as relatively unimportant.38 The threat to the environment led 
to the establishment of an environmental impact assessment produced by the Sullom Voe 
Environmental Advisory Group (SVEAG) set up in 1974 by the Council and oil industry. There 
were concerns that SVEAG was secretive and that its membership was skewed towards the 
interests of oil development but some concessions to these concerns were necessary.39 
Despite some local Shetland Tory opposition, a Scottish Office Minister expressed the 
Conservative Government’s support for the Bill and told the Commons that civil servants 
had offered the Council help. He acknowledged that what was proposed were “unusual 
powers, but they are being sought in order to deal with a very unusual situation in a very 
special part of Britain with peculiar local characteristics.”40 The change of Government in 
February 1974 did not alter matters. A report to the Treasury from the new Secretary of 
State for Scotland outlined thinking in March:  
The Secretary of State considers that the Bill in its present form is desirable and 
necessary to deal with the situation arising in Shetland because of the discovery of 
oil in the Northern North Sea. The powers it gives to the County Council are 
necessary for the following reasons: 
(a) The geographical nature of the coastline with a number of natural harbours makes 
close control and co-ordination of harbour development of great importance. 
(b) The oil discoveries in the East Shetland Basin will have to be exploited by the 
construction of substantial oil storage and terminal works in Shetland within a 
limited timescale. 
(c) These developments must be closely co-ordinated and carried out with minimum 
disturbance to the environment. 
(d) The existing economy of Shetland is finely balanced and peculiarly delicate control of 
new development will be required to ensure its integration without economic 
damage.41 
 
But this public statement did not reflect internal Whitehall concerns. In March 1974, the 
Scottish Office brought “a potentially awkward situation” to the attention of the Treasury. 
The Council in Shetland was proposing that oil companies make a substantial payment to 
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the local authority “by way of a ‘throughput charge’ based on either the quantity or the 
value of oil passing.”42 Even with the new powers granted in the Zetland County Council Bill 
– at that stage still awaiting formal enactment – the Council would not have the power to 
require a payment. Instead, the Council had the power to “receive it if it is voluntarily paid 
as a gift by the companies.” The Government had no way of preventing such gifts nor 
controlling how it could be spent and this money would not affect entitlement to central 
grant in paying for local services.43 There were implications for central government: 
(a) the effect on the Government’s own ‘take’ in terms of royalty and tax. 
(b) the precedent it could set for other areas. 
(c) its effect on the political arguments about the hypothecation of oil revenues for 
Scotland.44 
Central government had no powers to prevent oil companies paying the council but “it 
might be possible to persuade the oil companies concerned to take a tougher line than they 
appeared to be likely to do at present” though this might create “both political and 
administrative problems.”45 The Council would complain that Westminster was preventing 
the islands from getting proper recompense for disturbance caused by oil and this would, as 
the official noted, be supported by both the Scottish National Party and Liberal Party. It 
would also likely lead the Council to adopt a “non-co-operative attitude to planning 
applications from the oil companies” leading to complications and a drawn out planning 
process with an impact on oil production.46  
Cabinet Ministers did not like the way the Council was operating. Ted Short, a senior 
Cabinet Minister agreed with Secretary of State for Scotland Willie Ross and the Paymaster 
General in objecting to the way the Council was operating. Short deplored the “way in 
which the County Council have gone about seeking such payments” but acknowledged the 
“political implications in Scotland of appearing to wield the big stick on behalf of wealthy oil 
companies and against a small and hardly prosperous county council” noting particularly the 
likely reaction of local MP Jo Grimond and the SNP. His view was that “our approach should 
be to try to get the political credit for helping to bring about a reasonable settlement; and 
thereby to demonstrate to the County Council that there are better ways of securing their 
objectives (to the extent that they are reasonable) than the very dubious one they have 
chosen.”47 
Concerns were also articulated in the second reading debate by a number of Labour MPs in 
Parliament reflecting a paternalist attitude. One referred to the “simple gentle people” who 
would be outwitted by “land-grabbing Mafia of Edinburgh and Texas.”48 Another questioned 
whether the Council had the expertise to become a harbour authority and whether the 
Government would support other authorities seeking similar powers.49 This attitude may 
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have worked to the islands’ advantage in the tendency of oil companies and the UK 
Government to underestimate Shetland’s leadership. The only MP to have been born in 
Shetland was Norman Lamont, who would become Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1990, 
and represented Kingston-upon-Thames in the Commons. Lamont viewed the arrival of oil 
and oil companies with “considerable trepidation” but he welcomed the Bill because it 
would enable the Council to “come to terms with considerable problems” that “will descend 
upon Shetland.” He raised a concern frequently mentioned in discussions in Shetland, the 
prospect of an oil spill.50 
A report on Shetland’s oil era produced by Shetland Islands Council in 1978 reflected on the 
experience and noted the ‘stormy passage’ of the legislation through Parliament.51 Thirteen 
petitions were lodged against the Bill including from Nordport Ltd who argued that Sullom 
Voe would be adversely affected by the Council having control and that it was 
unprecedented for a Council to have such powers which exceeded those of any other 
councils. Nordport Ltd also objected that there was no right of appeal to any supervisory 
authority.52 Total Oil Marine Ltd also objected and was the only oil company to have 
acquired land (at Scatsta Ness for a marine terminal). Total objected to the Council having a 
monopoly over construction works in a widely defined coastal area which might incorporate 
much of Shetland. Local residents, overlooking Sullom Voe, objected and suggested that 
greater benefits would accrue to the local community if development was in private hands 
with necessary resources to ensure development occurred. Shetland Fishermen’s 
Association objected as did Young’s Seafoods Ltd plus a number of local individuals. Only 
one supporting petition was lodged. The Shetland Civic Society argued that the Council was 
best able to extract maximum community benefit with minimum disruption. 
The objections were heard in Edinburgh beginning in June 1973 before a Select Committee 
consisting of two Labour and two Conservative MPs. Many of the objections made by local 
Shetlanders were addressed effectively by the Council with reassurances and minor 
amendments. Nordport Ltd proved the main objector. They argued that they were more 
competent than the Council, that the powers exceeded those of any other council, and that 
the compulsory purchase powers would be used in an unsatisfactory way. The Select 
Committee deliberated over 18 days and included a visit to Shetland. The MPs split along 
party lines with the two Labour MPs supporting compulsory purchase powers while the 
Conservatives opposed with the Conservative Chair having a casting vote against. The 
Council challenged this and the Convener and senior official were allowed to address a 
meeting of Conservative MPs. By this stage, the discoveries of oil were such that it was clear 
that the impact on Shetland was set to be far greater than anticipated only a couple of years 
before. Compromises were found notably in convincing Parliamentarians that the powers 
would be limited in their use. By the time the Select Committee in the Lords was considering 
the measure, there were few outstanding disputes. Nordport Ltd withdrew its objections. 
But it had been a long battle. 
The Council suffered a setback at Committee stage when the committee ruled against the 
Council’s proposals for compulsory purchase. This led to a period of intense lobbying to 
have this decision reversed. The danger of development being held up due to this dispute 
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proved advantageous to the Council. War in the Middle East resulting in oil shortages 
increased pressure to get oil ashore without delay. A consultant’s report made it clear that 
the areas to be affected by development would be limited helping to remove fears that the 
Council intended development throughout the islands with mass compulsory purchase of 
properties. By November 1973, the Bill was ready to return to the Commons and make its 
way through the House of Lords. The second reading was held in the Lords in January 1974 
by which time the only objector was Nordport Ltd.53 
But Parliament was dissolved on February 8th when an election was called by Prime Minister 
Heath. Heath had felt compelled to call an election in large measure due to the energy crisis 
and miners’ strike. The election meant that the Bill would not be passed in time before 
dissolution. But unlike public bills, some categories of private bills can be carried forward 
into the next Parliament avoiding having to start the whole process afresh with the resultant 
costs and delays. The carry-over motion was passed on the day Parliament was dissolved 
allowing proceedings to be picked up where they were left off after the election. The 
Zetland County Council Act was finally given Royal Assent in April 1974. The legislation gave 
the Council considerable powers: 
 as a harbour authority with jurisdiction to operate in Sullom Voe and other named 
ports; 
 to issue licences to dredge and construct within three miles of coastal area; 
 to invest in bodies corporate; 
 to control development for conservation in the coastal area; 
 to purchase land compulsorily; 
 to construct, purchase or hire vessels to carry out these functions; 
 to establish a reserve fund. 
The last power would prove key in the continuing relations with the oil companies. 
Shetland’s oil fund would provide the islands with a revenue source that would allow it to 
invest in local communities into the future. 
 
Conclusion: Shetland’s communities and the oil 
Extractive industries will require to engage with some authoritative body where ever they 
seek to exploit natural resources. Their first question asked by oil companies was likely to 
have been who speaks for Shetland and its communities? The initial answer was confused. A 
variety of voices claimed to speak for Shetland. These included local communities, without 
necessarily having any official status, the local MP, various civic bodies, local government 
and central government. But alongside these were the myriad of local interests including 
the fishing and fish processing industries but also individuals and communities most likely to 
be directly affected by any development. The UK state also had an authoritative voice and 
one that the local council acknowledged but recognized would not necessarily act in 
Shetland’s interests. 
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The challenge is that even in a small archipelago such as Shetland, there will be a range of 
divergent interests and views on a development that would have a transformative impact. 
Who then speaks for these communities? In liberal democracies, the answer is that these 
divergences are aggregated, differences resolved and decisions are made by elected 
representative bodies. But this can and did create tensions which were evident in debates 
and votes on the local council. Just as the UK Government took the view that this 
development had significant state-wide implications and needed to be involved, so too did 
the local council seek to have involvement on behalf of the collective interest of the islands. 
The main battle in this respect took place in the early years and focused on the role of the 
Council and the extent to which and how more local interests should be accommodated. 
Leaving decisions to elected representatives, even when elections are held regularly, would 
be inadequate with the need for continuous deliberation with local communities. The 
information asymmetries were stark: between the oil companies and government at all 
levels and between government and local communities. Shetland County Council was slow 
to appreciate the importance of deliberation but the experience of oil developments in the 
early 1970s would provide lessons. New formal community organisations were formed, 
debates were held at which various opinions and positions were debated. They key to the 
most successful community engagement appears to have been when there was 
transparency, deliberation, following a lengthy iterative process.  
But the line dividing legitimate local community interests and individuals seeking a fast buck 
is unclear. Indeed, external interests were keen to take advantage of developments and to 
hide behind locals. This was evident in the case of Nordport Ltd. which sought to profit from 
a high profile development that attracted considerable external interest. Investigations and 
inputs from Members of Parliament representing constituencies well beyond Shetland 
played an important part in highlighting those seeking an easy profit. The Scotsman 
newspaper invested considerable staff time in covering oil developments and ensured that 
much light would be shed on developments that the local newspaper did not have the 
capacity to perform. The local paper played an important role in dissemination of 
information and as a forum for debate.  
Time was a major factor especially as the oil companies and UK Government were keen to 
extract the oil as quickly as possible. The Council’s need to build capacity would take time 
and the process of gaining the legislative powers required was a slow process. The need to 
engage meaningfully with local communities involved the provision of information and 
many meetings. This could not be done quickly. 
In the final analysis, the asymmetries were never, nor could ever, have been removed. But 
the Council demonstrated an ability to take on identify its needs and pursue these with 
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